for very helpful critics and suggestions. I also very much bene…tted from comments of the participants of the sessions at the 7 th Spring Meeting of the Young Economists at Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, at the 4 th Workshop on Institutional Analysis at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona and at the Midterm Workshop in Law and Economics at the University of Bologna. The Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged for …nancial support. Comments and suggestions are welcome! Abstract Observing a strong increase in over-indebted households, several European countries identi…ed the need for a separate regulation for consumer debt release and amended their laws accordingly. This paper systematizes and classi…es the tools employed by the various regulations and analyzes them in a hidden action framework. A signi…cant in ‡uence on the consumer's choices is identi…ed, not only prior to distress, but also post …ling: during the so called 'period of good conduct'. The paper appraises the capacity of the regulations to implement the e¢cient choices at both occasions, and examines the interplay of ex-ante and ex-post incentives. Even though the institution of debt release is shown to be a substantial and desirable quality of a bankruptcy regulation ex-post, many regulations are likely to distort the debtor's choices. A rule mitigating such distortions is proposed. Still, a trade-o¤ between ex-ante and ex-post e¢ciency persists, as the prospect of debt release is competent of distorting the debtor's choices prior to distress. Several instruments to mitigate these contortions are discussed.
Introduction
An increasing number of consumer goods, such as cars, furniture or electronic equipment, is bought on credit. Instead of …rst accumulating su¢cient savings and then purchasing these goods, it has become common among consumers to buy on credit, and pay these credits from their future earnings. Possible reasons for the more frequent use of credits are seen in a change of the attitude towards borrowing, a deregulation of consumer credit and the resulting increasing competition in the credit market, which made credits easily accessible for consumers. From a welfare perspective this seems to be a desirable development, since it enables consumers to shift consumption to the most preferred period, and, thus, allows for a less constraint maximization of inter-temporal utility. However, as a ‡ip side of easier accessibility of credits, default rates have risen considerably.
It is often argued that these rapidly rising …ling rates can not only be attributed to the mere increase in number of credits, but rather to the fact that consumers take insu¢cient precaution to avoid distress. As a result, consumers may be tempted to pro…t from default, by externalizing the risk of credit on their creditors. 1 Since some bankruptcy systems encourage the debtor to …le for bankruptcy, even when her ability of paying is high. In the U.S., as an example, which has had tradititionally debtor friendly regulations, …ling rates have quintupled in the last …fteen years. As a result of this development, creditors have lost about $39 billion in 1998 due to consumer bankruptcy …lings. 2 As a result, bankruptcy provisions are currently being reformed in the U.S. as to make debt release more di¢cult to consumers as well as to increase creditors' return. 3 Since debtors do have certain in ‡uence on the likelihood of default, these reforms might induce them to take more precaution to avoid distress the higher the obstacles for a fresh start are. In 1 As an example Fay, Hurst and White (2002) …nd in their analysis more support for the strategic bankrutpcy model, than the one which attributes distress to adverse events. this respect unlimited liability or a regulation that o¤ers no regulated debt release is said to be the preferable regulation from an e -ante viewpoint, as it gives the debtor no opportunity to derive any pro…t from default on debt payments.
In continental Europe, on the contrary, until recently, debt release hasn't underlied any regulation across the countries. There, it had been observed that in the absence of a legally regulated fresh start, once an individual is heavily indebted 4 , she is rarely able to withdraw herself from such a situation, i.e. almost never does she manage to agree with her creditors on a payment plan. 5 As a result, these debtors may remain overindebted. In the German capital city of Berlin, as an example, about 10% of all households are estimated to be in …nancial distress. 6 Altogether 2.6 million households are estimated to be overindebted in Germany. 7 This is a problem, since (as Graver (1997) puts it) "over-indebtedness often leads to unemployment, deteriorating family relations, and demand for assistance from the social services." In other words, since those individuals with high pending debt are immediately dispossessed of every Euro they might earn, they -as a rational response-give up on attempting to repay at all. Instead they might choose to work less or even quit working entirely, living instead on social welfare. This e¤ect obviously imposes costs on society; creating a need for government intervention to provide regulation for debt release, in order to allow the "morally sound debtor" 8 a path back to normal life. Thus from an ex-post perspective it seems desirable to o¤er the debtor a way out of distress.
Identifying this necessity, many European countries substantially reformed their bankruptcy codes during the last two decades, while introducing special regulations for consumer debt release. These regulations entail a kaleidoscope of various tasks that allow the debtor to qualify for debt release. From one extreme, Danish law provides an immediate fresh start (i.e. an immediate 4 The term heavily indebted or over-indebted debtor is often used in this paper, it points at debtors who are not only unable to meet their current debt obligations, but also cannot expect to repay the entire debt within a reasonable period. 5 As an example, in 2002 only in 5% of all consumer bankruptcy proceedings in Germany a settlement was reached. (Source: German Federal Statistics Bureau). 6 Berliner Senatsverwaltung für Arbeit, Soziales und Frauen (2000). 7 Hess et. al. (2000) 8 This intention is stated in many insolvency codes: for an example, the German Insolvency Code states in § 1 InsO as the aim of the regulation, to o¤er the morally sound debtor an opportunity to rid herself of the remaining debt. (Dem redlichen Schuldner wird Gegenheit geben, sich von seinen restlichen Verbindlichkeiten zu befreien.) A similar intention is also present in the legal theory in the U.S. as seen, for instance, in Grogan vs. Garner 498 U.S. 279, 112 L. Ed. 2d 755, 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991) where it was stated that debt release should be provided to the 'honest and unfortunate debtor. ' release from debt) to the 'hopelessly' indebted debtor (Iversen 2000) , to the other extreme in which lie Italy, Spain and basically France, 9 which o¤er no possibility for debt release at all (Niemi-Kiesilämen 1997). 10 In Germany, as an example, a release from remaining debt is only granted to the individual upon ful…llment of numerous requirements, which entail the seizure of her current assets and a six year lasting 'period of good conduct'. During that term the individual has to give over all her seizable income to the creditors to pay at least parts of her outstanding debt. As a matter of fact, most Commonwealth countries also know a period of good conduct, however, they do not require an attempt to repay, and instead try to ensure that the individual is in good standing and make the debtor subject to various penalties and constraints, before granting a debt release. 11 Only at …rst sight, such requirements aim at maximizing creditors' return. At a closer examination, the intention can be seen as an education of the debtor towards a more careful treatment of credits. Apart from such non-monetary penalties, found in various bankruptcy regulations, there are several other tasks imposed on the debtor who …led a petition for a fresh start. In general, two tools can be identi…ed in the various bankruptcy regulations: the seizure of current assets, and the garnishment of future income for a certain period. The former is basically the regulation of Ch. 7 in the U.S. bankruptcy code, while the latter is, for instance used in Ch. 13 of the U.S. code. The latter is also often used in connection with the seizure of assets is used in most continental European regulations. As aresult of various reforms, the bankruptcy regulation in the most industrialized countries are aliging. To explain: the regulations in many continental European countries changed from allowing no debt relase at all to allowing it under certain conditions, and the changes in the U.S. regulations made a fresh start more di…cult and limited its scope.
From a theoretical standpoint a bankruptcy regulation has two function: …rst, a su¢cient ex-ante threat to ensure a careful handling of credits, and, second, ex-post alleviation, once the debtor is in distress to o¤er a path 9 In Italy as well as in France reforms are currently in legislation to introduce the possibility of debt release to for consumers. 10 A comprehensive review of regulations and reforms of consumer bankruptcy in Europe can be found in an issue of the Journal of Consumer Policy 1997, i.e. Niemi-Kiesilämen (1997), Whitford (1997), Sullivan et. al (1997) and Ramsay (1997) . 11 As an example, in the U.K. in case of a voluntary petition, the debtor is only allowed to keep a limited number of exempt assets, but during a two to three period she is subject to various penalties; amongst which are the loss of the right to hold a public o¢ce, tight monitoring and restrictions on her …nancial interactions. The law in most former British colonies is very similar. Efrat (2001) out. This paper systematically classi…es the tools employed by the various bankruptcy regulation, and analyzes their capacity to meet these con ‡icting objectives. A thorough theoretical analysis of various personal bankruptcy regulations has, to my best knowledge, not been done so far. The paper investigates the e¤ects on the debtor's e¤ort choices at the two dates in hidden action framework and gives welfare implications. Adler, Polak and Schwartz (2000) analyze the ex-ante e¤ects of debt release on consumers' endeavors to avoid distress, while Bigus and Steiger (2002) focus on the expost incentives. This paper explicitly integrates ex-post …ndings into ex-ante analysis and considers the interplay of these two dates, in other words the endogenous limits on liability.
Bankruptcy regulations do not only in ‡uence the debtor's choices prior to distress, but also have a serious impact on the consumer's choice after distress, during the so-called 'period of good conduct.' The model considers the e¤ects of these liability rules on the incentives of consumer debtors, acknowledging that such legal mandates do have consequences not only on the contracting parties themselves but also entail social welfare e¤ects. The interactions between debtor and creditor are analyzed in a multi-period strategic game. Moral hazard seems to be present at two dates: with respect to the consumer's e¤ort to avoid distress, and also, after …ling, with respect to her work e¤ort during the period of good conduct. Since ex-post the ability of the individual debtor is bounded, insiting on payment of the entire outstanding debt may result in the debtor's denial of participation, and result in zero returns to all participants. Instead, the requirement, imposed on the debtor seeking a debt release, has to respect her …nancial capability. Moreover, it should not distort incentives, since the return to the creditor largely depends on future income, i.e. the debtor's economic performance. If this is not appreciated, the debtor might choose an insu¢cient e¤ort or entirely refrain from participation, which, in turn, would not only diminishe the return to the creditor, but would also cause a welfare loss. 12 A …xed sum is found to satisfy both conditions, and, this result is shown to be also stable to the introduction of risk aversion. Introducing these …ndings into the exante analysis, namely e¤ects on the credit market and the debtor's endeavors to avoid distress, it has been found that any form of debt release, however, ex-post necessary and e¢cient, is likely to distort the individual's ex-ante incentives. Generally, from an ex-ante perspective, it can be argued that the harder the bankruptcy regulation, the more precaution the debtor will 12 Pushing it to the extreme, the argument becomes more clear: if the selected e¤ort is so low that the individual does not work at all and lives instead on welfare, costs are imposed on society.
take, and hence, the lesser the distortion. The implications of the debtor's risk attitude on these results are discussed, as well as e¤ects on the credit market. A numerical example clari…es these considerations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The following section gives the indispensable background information: placing the paper in the extant legal and economic literature; explaining why, despite the comprehensive literature on corporate bankruptcy, a distinct treatment regarding personal bankruptcy is sensible and gives an overview of existing legal regulations. In section 3 the setting is put up for the analysis given in sections 4 to 6. In section 4 the ex-post e¤ects are analyzed. These are incorporated in the ex-ante analysis in section 5. Section 6 clari…es the results with a numerical example, followed by a discussion (section 7) about the assumptions and results. Finally, section 8 states the conclusion.
Legal Background and Extant Literature
The history of personal bankruptcy regulation dates back almost four-thousand years to the code of Hammurabi 13 which awarded a fresh start to the debtor after four years of debt bondage. In the middle ages harsh penalties, such as debtors' prison, were imposed on defaulting debtors. These meant that a defaulting debtor was imprisoned until his debt was paid entirely. It can be said that these penalties were targeted not so much on debt collection but on the provision of a su¢cient ex-ante threat. 14 Modern history of personal bankruptcy dates back about 200 years when in 1705 in England and in 1898 in the U.S. regulations for non-business persons to …le for bankruptcy were introduced (Forsebald (1997)). However, substantial reforms had been carried out in both countries during the last twenty years and are still discussed today. 15 In continental Europe, speci…c consumer bankruptcy codes allowing for a partial discharge were enacted mostly in the nineties; 16 still 13 In Art. 117 Code of Hammurabi (1789 B.C.) a debt release was already instituted: "If any one fail to meet a claim for debt, and sell himself, his wife, his son, and daughter for money or give them away to forced labor: they shall work for three years in the house of the man who bought them, or the proprietor, and in the fourth year they shall be set free." (translation in the Eleventh Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, 1910 by Claude Hermann Walter Johns). many countries do not allow a debt release for consumers, for instance Italy, Mongolia, Switzerland, Spain and in a sense also France. 17 And even in Italy and France there are currently reforms being enacted, introducing the possibility of consumer debt release. 18 Efrat (2001) identi…es the reasons for these reforms in a deregulation of the credit market and argues that less developed capital markets, or in countries with a lower devotion towards entrepreneurship debt rescheduling regulations are harsh or fail to exist at all. In legal theory and also in several reform discussions the argument had been present to give a fresh start only to the innocent debtors, while penalizing the others: this means that only those debtors who su¤ered an exogenous shock should be given the opportunity of a fresh start, i.e. overindebtedness due to considerable medical expenses, or debt caused by involuntary unemployment. This line of argument can be found, for example, also in the current reform discussion on personal bankruptcy in the U.S., where many members of the congress have been supporting a regulation that should systematically evaluate the circumstances of those who seek a debt relief. 19 The same is true for Germany where during the discussion for the introduction of a debt rescheduling regulation it was proposed that the length of the 'period of good conduct' should be conditioned on the circumstances, i.e. whether distress was the debtor's fault. 20 Still, this is not a new thought. Unconditional debt release for distress due to an exogenous shock was already possible in the code of Hamurabi. 21 In the model, I do acknowledge the fact that distress can occur due to 17 See Forsblad (1997), Trendelenburg (2000) . With respect to France, the court may discharge the creditor's interest claim, but not the principal claim, see Trendelenburg (2000). 18 Get references from Thierry and Maurizio!!!!! 19 See Jacoby (2002) for a review of the reform discussion. Yet, the completely unencumbered fresh start remains a hallmark of the U.S. bankruptcy system to the honest and unfortunate debtor (see e.g. Grogan vs. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, (1991) (citing Local Loan Co. vs. Hint, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)). 20 The innocent debtors or 'morally sound applicants' should be o¤ered a second chance to …nd a path back to normal life. As an example: during the discussion on the introduction of debt release in Germany the Social Democratic Party (SPD) did propose a period of variable length to obtain debt release. But it was in fact a more 'need-based' approach, pointing at the origin of debt: debt release should even have been granted immediately if the overindebtedness was not the debtor's fault (see Kübler & Prütting (1994) ). 21 In article 48, it is stated: " If any one owe a debt for a loan, and a storm prostrates the grain, or the harvest fails, or the grain does not grow for lack of water; in that year he need not give his creditor any grain, he washes his debt-tablet in water and pays no rent for this year." The shirkers, though, could not hope for any ease of payment, as article 52 states: "If the cultivator do not plant corn or sesame in the …eld, the debtor's contract is not weakened." unforeseen events such as the loss of job or a change in family status, yet, the likelhood of the shock is subject to the individual's e¤ort (i.e. the shock is at least partly endogenous). 22 And, if the regulation provides the debtor with adequate incentives to avoid such calamities, she would take su¢cient precaution. Put di¤erently, this paper is not an attempt to develop a mechanism that would separate the shirkers from the innocent, instead it searches for a mechanism that motivates the debtor to take su¢cient precaution to avoid distress. The path to debt release may di¤er in many aspects across legislations. However, besides possible moral requirements, they mostly stipulate either the seizure of the individual's current non-exempt assets, or the garnishment of future income, or both. The period of good conduct is usually of a …xed lenght and not -as advocated in this paper-determined by a certain amount. To provide a basic idea of regulations, a rough description of the U.S. and German regulation is given.
Under the U.S. bankruptcy code of 1997 23 , the debtor is allowed to …le for bankruptcy and can obtain a debt discharge even without the creditor's approval, and, moreover, does not even need to be unable to meet her credit obligations. Even though a debtor can be forced into bankruptcy, she always has the exclusive chapter choice between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. Under Chapter 7 ("Straight liquidation"), the debtor is obliged to use her entire existing assets beyond an exemption level to repay her debt but does not have to give up any future earnings. 25 If she chooses Chapter 13 "adjustment of debts for individuals with regular income" she is allowed to retain her current property, and instead proposes a payment plan to creditors to convey part of her future earnings to repay the debt -usually over a period of three to …ve years. However, the value of the payment plan is determined by her current wealth, since creditors are guaranteed to get at least as much as under Ch. 7. 26 Upon ful…llment of these requirements the debtor obtains a 22 Note, that the paper does not contribute to the discussion about the 'honest and unfortunate vs. the careless debtor,' i.e. releasing only those individuals who su¤ered some exogenous shock, e.g. huge medical bills due to insu¢cient health insurance (see e.g. Jacoby 2001). 23 There is currently a debate on a reform of the bankrupty regulation in the U.S. The proposal basically aims at limiting the debtor's chapter choice by the so-called means test and restrict the scope of debt release. For a review, see Price (2002) and Bigus & Steiger (2002) . Still, the refrom does not alter the fundamental principles, as discussed in the model. 24 See Wang & White (2000) . The current reform proposal limits the debtor's chapter choice, in order to increase the return to the debtor (see Bigus and Steiger (2002) for a discussion). 25 The scope and extent of the exemption level is de…ned by state and federal law and di¤ers largely across states (Whitford (1997) ). 26 This means that the 'value' of Ch. 13 is determined by the debtor's current assets. right for debt discharge. 27 Note, that there is currently a reform pending in the Senate which substantially reforms the current bankruptcy regulation, replacing the debtor's choice between chapters by the so-called 'means test. ' The German Insolvency Code (or 'Insolvenzordnung' hereinafter InsO) had been substantially reformed in 1999 and 2001, also introducing the possibility of debt release for individual debtors, as stated in § § 286¤ InsO. Debt release without the creditor's approval (as considered here) is regarded as "ultima ratio," and is only applied if prior attempts for settlement failed completely. The regulation requires at least one out-of-court and one in-court attempt for settlement. 28 If these fail the court may rule that the debtor's assets are entirely liquidated and all her income beyond subsistence level for the next six years is entirely garnished. 29 Upon ful…llment of these requirements a debt release is granted by the court. Similar regulations exist for instance in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. 30 These regulations are extremely di¤erent: a debt release can be obtained relatively easy in the U.S., while it is a rather onerous task in Europe. A reason for this can be seen in the history and environment of the countries' legal systems. 31 As a matter of fact, it is observed that the regulations tend to level during the last decades; European regulations are weakened, while in the common law tradition requirements are becomming more stringent (Efrat 2001 ).
As noted by Gropp et. al. (1997) that "...despite the importance of personal bankruptcy, the subject has almost completely been neglected by economists." Still, there are a number of articles dealing with the topic, which could be found mainly in the U.S., pointing at particular problems in the U.S. regulation: mainly how consumers are likely to pro…t from bankruptcy. White (1998) , for example, shows that one third of all U.S. households would pro…t from …ling for bankruptcy. It is, moreover, observed that due to the The current reform propsal is targeted on a limitation of chapter choice (Bigus and Steiger (2002) ). 27 Note, that there is no mandatory attempt for settlement within the procedure, neither in-nor out-of-court, still there are many debt consulting agencies and a settlement is strongly encouraged. 28 In order to get an out-of-court settlement approved creditors have to unanimously agree; and still, for the in-court settlement a majority of the heads and sum of debts have to agree. 29 There exisist also an incentive instrument, in the …fth and sixth year of the period of good conduct 10% resp. 20% of the debtor's return are returned to her by the trustee. ( § 292 InsO). 30 see e.g. Efrat (2001) , Forsebald (1997) and Holzhammer (1996) for Austria. 31 As an example, consider that the exogenous probability for distress is higher in the U.S. due to lesser social security, health care, etc. unequal exemption rates across states, consumers can extract pro…ts by …rst moving and then …lingt for bankruptcy (see e.g. Weiss, Bhandari and Robins (2001) ). Another issue is the consumer's privilege of chapter choice, discussed as for example in White (1998) and Wang & White (2000) , who propose a merger of Ch. 7 and Ch. 13 to mitigate the shortcomings created by chapter choice. Alexopoulos & Domowitz (1998) consider the adverse e¤ects on the credit market imposed by consumer bankruptcy regulation. Hynes & Posner (2002) give a survey of the main patterns of consumer …nace regulations focusing their analysis on the di¤erent treatment of secured and unsecured credit in bankruptcy regulations. Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) note that people may …le for bankruptcy simply to pay their mortgage rates, such that higher exemption rates result in lower interest rates for secured credits. Berkowitz & White (2002) focus on e¤ects of bankruptcy regulations on small …rms' access to credit. In short: all these papers rather point at ex-ante e¤ects of the regulation 32 and do not consider welfare or incentive e¤ects after …ling. Only Zabarowski & Zweifel (1999) consider the e¤ects of wage garnishment on individual debtors, however, without considering the e¤ects of debt release regulations. They show that a 100% garnishment of wages may lead to a decline in labor supply, and propose instead a partial garnishment. 33 In a broader view, the paper can also be related to the literature on …nancing instruments under limited liability (e.g. Innes (1990) and Robe (1999) ). However, these papers rather focus on the optimal …nancial instruments, showing that a debt contract can lead to optimal incentives, especially under unlimited liability. This paper takes a closer look at the limits of liability, noting that even though parties might have agreed on unlimited liability ex-ante, the debtor might in some states simply be incapable of paying the obligation, and in this case insisting on full payment would deteriorate the latters incentives and hence also the return to the creditor.
A theoretical inquiry of consumer bankruptcy, closer to this paper, is found in Adler, Polak & Schwartz (2000), who analyze ex-ante e¤ects of the U.S. regulation, showing that any kind of debt release is likely to create an increasing distortion in the consumer's economic choices, the lower the expected recovery rate of the creditor is. 34 Last, in Bigus & Steiger (2002) the ex-post e¤ects on the debtor's behavior are considered, calculating the necessary shortening of the period of good conduct to encourage the debtor to 32 This is rather understandable, since under Ch. 7, which is usually selected in the U.S., there is no reason for an ex-post ananlysis. 33 A theoretical discussion of the e¤ects of partial garnishment can be found in Bigus & Steiger (2002) . 34 Furthermore, they consider renegotiations that turn out to have ambiguous e¤ects on welfare, but are especially valuable for relatively poor persons. perform a su¢cient e¤ort during that period, and giving a welfare comparison of the various regulations. I extend this paper along several dimensions: …rst by taking a more general view on the ex-post situation, and then linking ex-ante and ex-post considerations, by taking the limits of liability as endogenous. Last, the consumer's risk attitude is discussed ex-ante and ex-post.
Before starting the analysis, two questions still need to be answered: First, why, despite the vast literature on corporate bankruptcy, 35 a separate treatment of personal bankruptcy is necessary; and, second, why the state should provede a supervised consumer bankruptcy procedure? To answer the …rst question one needs to consider the particular situation in personal bankruptcy. Here, as opposed to corporate bankruptcy, there is no decision where the assets would be put to their highest use, i.e. liquidation vs. continuation. Instead, liability is de…ned in a much broader sense in personal bankruptcy: the debtor is not only liable with current but also with any future assets she might acquire. This usually means her future income. This is important, because the standard credit contract as analyzed by Gale and Hellwig (1985) or Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) ('in the good state pay back the debt, in the bad state give me all you have') cannot be applied, since the latter ('all you have') is mostly determined by the debtor's future income, which depends on her e¤ort. In other words, personal bankruptcy is not simply a redistribution, the regulations are shown to have welfare implications. This paper anlyzes the e¤ects of four stylized regulations on the decisions of the participants, showing how the bankruptcy regulation might determine the debtor's e¤ort decion, and thereby, the return to the creditor.
This leads to the second question on the need of state intervention. The setting in consumer bankruptcy is usually much simpler, as only few creditors are involved, etc. However, it was observed that without state supplied debt release procedure for consumers, agreements were hardly ever reached between participants. As a result, debtors stayed overindebted, and mostly refused to work: neither paying o¤ their debt, nor receiving a discharge. This development had actaully been the main motivation for the reform in Germany and the rest of continental Europe.
Hence in case of default, there is a strong bargaining imbalance between the creditors and the debtor, since the creditors usually simply insist on full payment and the debtor has little to o¤er in terms of payment or future business. 36 In this paper I omit a discussion of this failure of agreement 35 For an overview on this literature see, Aghion (1998) or Bhandari & Weiss (1996) . 36 The ex-ante failure can be probably explained by some bounded rationality behavior of consumers and that creditors try to sidestep the possible distortion that the idea of a possible debt release might cause. Ex-post there is a strong bargaining imbalance among and take, instead, an incomplete contracting view: claiming that an explicit contracting on the possibility of default would be too costly for both parties and the regulation is, therefore, better provided in a standardized way by the state. 
Setting
After …ling for bankruptcy (at t = 2) the debtor's assets are seized to satisfy the creditor's claim. At this date the debtor has a time horizon of T periods t 2 f2; :::; T g.
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In each of these periods she chooses an e¤ort level that in ‡uences her expected income. In each remaining period the debtor's income y t is a random variable:
With probability ¼ she either earns y 1 ; or with probability (1 ¡ ¼) she earns y 2 , with y 1 > y 2¸0 . The debtor can in ‡uence these probabilities by choosing an e¤ort level e i ; with i 2 fh; lg :The e¤ort can either be high e h or low e l , at costs c i 2 fc h ; c l g ; c h > c l > 0: The e¤ort level in ‡uences the probabilities for income realization in each period, hence, probabilities become ¼ h for the high e¤ort and ¼ l respectively.
² prob.fy = y 2 j eg = 1¡ prob. fy = y 1 je g ; for e = e h ; e l
For notational convenience y th is used to indicate expected income when a high e¤ort is choosen and y tl is used to indicate expected income, when the low e¤ort level is choosen, i.e. y th
Generally, to indicate per period variables we use small letters, while for lifetime matters capital letters are used.
The model is, furthermore, based on the following assumptions:
1. Debtor's e¤ort choice cannot be observed by the creditor nor by some third party, e.g. the bankruptcy court. Rather only the realized income is observed. However, the probabilities for the states, as well as the costs of each level of e¤ort, are known to the parties ex-ante. 37 This can be regarded as her remaining lifetime or working time. For simplicity the time horizon is …xed and known to the parties.
2. High e¤ort is assumed to be e¢cient, so that a debtor, who works for her own good, would choose a high e¤ort level:
3. Income realizations and probabilities in each period are independent of previous or future realizations or e¤ort, i.e. the correlation between periods is zero.
4. The outstanding debt is assumed to be …xed at all dates, there is no interest or discount rate.
5. Debtor has the possibility to abstain, i.e. not participate in the bankruptcy procedure. In this case she will exert no e¤ort at all and receive no income. Her debt will continue to be outstanding and any earnings she may attain would be seized immediately for the creditor's satisfaction. If she chooses to abstain she will not be awarded a fresh start and instead receive her reservation utility U 0 for all remaining periods. For simplicity the reservation utility is normalized to zero, i.e. U 0´0 : Abstention is assumed to be observable for the creditors and costless for the debtor.
6. At the date of …ling the debtor has no seizable assets or other belongings, i.e. A = 0: The asset A that has been bought with the credit is still in the debtor's possession at the date of …ling, but has no monetray value. It is assumed that the individual has no further sizeable assets.
7. The considered income y t is assumed to be disposable income, i.e. it can be entirely garnished during the period of good conduct. Costs of e¤ort are private costs to the debtor -they are not deducted from income, i.e. we do not bother with exemption rates, or subsistence levels. The amount to provide a basic subsistence level would either be earned by the individual or provided by social security. 38 Also, the e¤ort level is used to generate seizable income.
8. Furthermore, for the time being, all participants are assumed to be risk neutra. 38 This assumption is a little sloppy as there is a di¤erence between the amount provided by social welfare and exempt income. (see e.g. Tabelle des Bundesjustizministeriums vergl.... einfügen!!!) Furthermore, a di¤erentiation would not alter the results of the model, as one may regard the additional money left with the debtor as reimbursement for costs of e¤ort.
9. Participants maximize their lifetime income.
The last assumption (8) is made for convenience and will be relaxed later on. In addition, the e¤ects of a collateral (6) will be discussed later on. Assumptions (4) and (7) is mainly made for convenience, its relaxation would complicate the model without adding any qualitative new results. The independence of income realizations (3) might be seen as problematic, as there there seems to be an obvious interdependence between those realizations, as the debtor is not searching for a new job in each period. However, assuming a correlation would require highly speci…c assumptions, which can hardly be supported by statistical evidence. It is assumed in (5) that the debtor can choose to participate in the bankruptcy procedure. This assumption is sensible. Even if the debtor is obliged to pay the entire outstanding debt in all states, especialy when outstanding debt is quite large, she might choose to simply quit working. Following the rationale: if I do not get anything, my creditors won't either. It is assumed (8) that participants maximize their expected lifetime income. This is important, as the debtor may have a 'negative' income (due to her uncompensated costs of e¤ort) in some periods in order to ful…ll the prerequisits of the bankruptcy regulation. Assumptions (1) and (2) constitute the outlines of the structure. It may be contested that the e¤ort choice is unobservable. However, this may only be possible in very special cases and would entail large costs incurred by the monitoring party. The next section introcudes a stylized version of the analyzed insolvency regimes.
Conventionalized Bankruptcy Regulations
The overview section gave a survey of several regulations. Within this model four are analyzed in a stylized version. The names are inspired by certain existing regulations. 39 When talking about the requirement in general, I use the letter P (for penalty) to indicate the requirement the debtor has to ful…ll to be excused from further debt payments, i.e. the debtor is awarded a fresh start. The payment to the creditor made by the debtor per period is indicated by small letter p t with P t p t = P: P looks as follows under the various regulations: ² Chapter 7: when the debtor …les under Ch. 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code, all her current non-exempt assets are seized to satisfy creditors' 39 To keep the analysis as simple as possible, certain di¤erences in the various regualtion are discuounted. For example the di¤ereantiation between the right for a fresh start, as provided by U.S. law and the fact that a fresh start may be granted under German law.
claims, after which all remaining debt is discharged. In terms of the model this means P = A (= 0) ; since the asset is assumed to have no seizable value at the time of …ling.
² No Debt Release: here the debtor has to repay the entire amount of remaining debt, i.e. P = D. The regulation is also referred to in the literature as unlimited liability. This was basically the German Regulation before 1999.
² German Regulation: under the Insolvency Code of 1999 40 the debtor's non-exempt assets are seized and during a so-called 'period of good conduct' her disposable income is entirely garnished. At the end of this period if she is in good standing a debt release is granted. The creditor thus receives the asset and six years of income as compensation: P = A + 6y t :
² Proposal: In this regulation a particular amount is demanded from the debtor, as a condition for a fresh start. This amount is either the original debt P = D or some maximal amount P max which is determined according to the individual debror's abilities.
The table below summarizes the regulations and shows the payo¤s of both parties. Note, that the sum of payo¤s should always equal A+ P T t=2 (y t ¡ c t ) : In other words the debtor's income is 'just' redistributed. The next section analyzes how this redistribution a¤ects the debtor's incentives.
Regulation
Creditor
Ex-Post Analysis
After …ling for bankruptcy the debtor has to meet the requirements of the bankruptcy regulation in order to obtain a release from remaining debt. How do these requirements a¤ect the debtor's choices, and how much return do they create for the creditor? 40 Similar regulations exist, for instance, in Belgium or also Ch. 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code which demands the assignation of income for the next three to …ve years.
First Best
Referring to assumption (2) the …rst best outcome is achieved when the debtor chooses a high e¤ort in each subsequent period. Furthermore, since both parties are considered to be risk neutral, the social welfare function can be stated by adding the returns of both parties, i.e. Y D + Y C ; with the subscript C; D referring to the debtor and creditor resp.
Note, that the asset is not included in the social welfare function, as it represents soley a matter of redistirbution. Furthermore, the constraints which shape participants' choices need to be evaluated.
An important objective of the bankruptcy code is to maximize the return to the creditor, or, put di¤erently, minimize his losses, as the received sm should not exceed the outstanding debt. 41 Therefore, this aim is proclaimed as the objective function for this approach:
He wishes to minimize the loss in ‡icted upon him by the debtor …ling for bankruptcy protection, i.e. the gap between the original amount the debtor was supposed to pay under usual circumstances, and the return in case of bankruptcy. 42 Furthermore, we know from assumption (2) that it would be socially desirable if the debtor would choose a high e¤ort. This should, therefore, be incentivized by the regulation. The debtor would only be willing to choose the high level of e¤ort, even during the period of good conduct, i.e. while being subject to the provisions of the bankruptcy code, if it would improve her expected overall lifetime income, i.e. she expects to improve on U 0 . This is re ‡ected by her participation constraint (PC):
The indices p 1 ; p 2 indicate the penalty per period with a high (y 1 ) and a low (y 2 ) realization of income, with P 1 = T p 1 ; P 2 = T p 2; since the penalty 41 As it is stated in §1 of the German insolvency code InsO "...die Gläubiger eines Schuldners gemeinschaftlich zu befriedigen..." ("to jointly satisfy the debtor's creditors"). 42 However, one might argue that the creditor has no real participation constraint, since the credit contract has been signed in the past and he is thus, in a sense, locked in. On the other hand he may still wish to minimize losses, and it will later be shown that this becomes important in the ex-ante considerations.
can just be conditioned upon the realization of income. The debtor will only choose the high e¤ort, if it is incentive compatible (IC) for her:
The ideal rule should encourage the debtor to work hard, while minimizing the loss to the creditor. The next section analyzes the performance of the various rules.
Performance of Existing Rules
Under Ch. 7 there is not much reason for an ex-post analysis. After seizure of assets, the remaining penalty is zero, i.e. debtor works for her own good and faces a constraintless maximization problem of her remaining lifetime income. Hence, the individual rationality constraint (6) is always ful…lled, as well as the participation constraint (5), due to assumption (2). The creditor might feel insu¢ciently compensated, getting the lowest compensation of all rules, in other words this rule provides an unsatisfying solution to the creditor's minimization problem (4) . Yet, it is important to note that from a pure ex-post perspective this rules creates no welfare loss, as it provides optimal incentives for the debtor. This is true for all possible parameter combinations, i.e. regardless of the income expectations or the outstanding debt. From a welfare perspective the …rst best is achieved.
With no debt release, to the contrary, the creditor's minimization problem (4) is perfectly solved. No debt is discharged, i.e. P = D; and, thus, the loss imposed on the creditor is minimized. Also the IC constraint (6) always holds, since P 1 = P 2 = D; the amount demanded from the debtor is the same, either with high or low e¤ort. In regards to (7) the two penalties just cancel out and are irrelevant for the debtor's decision. As it can be seen below, a …xed amount does not change the IC constraint and we arrive again at:
(7) always holds due to assumption (2). However, there might be values of debt, under which her participation constraint (5) no longer holds. She cannot expect to repay the debt within a reasonable amount of time and thus would choos to quit working entirely. From (5) we arrive at the following condition:
Henceforth P max is de…ned as the maximal amount the consumer would be wiling to pay. For values of debt exceeding P max ; the debtor would refrain from any attempt to repay, giving the creditor no return at all. As a result, both parties are worse o¤. Outstanding debt is more likely to exceed P max the smaller T is, the lower the debtor's income expectations y th are, and the higher her personal costs of e¤ort c h are.
What follows directly from (7) and (8), can be summarized in a proposition:
Proposition 1 When the penalty imposed on a risk-neutral debtor is a …xed sum of money, which does not exceed the amount P max as de…nded in (8); the debtor will always choose the e¢cient e¤ort.
Remark 1 This result seems to be quite intuitive, however, it has broader consequences. It states that -from an ex-post perspective -there is always a limit on the debtor's willingness to pay. This is true, regardless of the penalties she might have to endure, even such extreme examples as debtors' prison or slavery, as a result of default. Such penalties might shift the debtor's reservation utility, but do not create an additional return. From an ex-post perspective it is useless to introduce such penalties, since it is not sub-game perfect. These penalties might be capable to su¢ciently threaten the debtor ex-ante, but have no bene…t ex-post.
Being aware of this e¤ect, the current German regulation does not insist on repaying the entire debt in all states of nature. After her assets have been seized her income is garnished for the following six years. 43 If the debtor has shown to the court her incapability of meeting her credit obligation she is excused. Although she has to show remorse and behave well during this period of good conduct, her actual e¤ort is still not observable. In other words, each realization of income would be entirely seized, i.e. y 1 = p 1; y 2 = p 2 : Thus her incentive compatibility constraint is
which when simpli…ed yields: 43 She will participate in the regulation, if her remaining lifetime income after is su¢cient to -at least -compensate her for her endeavors during the period of good conduct (i.e. (T ¡ 6) (y th ¡ c h ) ¡ 6c l¸0 holds).
, c l¸ch :
This, of course, never holds. Simply because it pleases no one to work for other people without any kind of compensation. Especially if she is able to achieve the same result (debt release after six years), when choosing the low e¤ort. After the period of good conduct, she will again work for her own bene…t and then, of course, choose the e¢cient e¤ort level. It is never rational for her to generate more than a minimum level of income so that she meets the requirements 'to be in good standing.' Nonetheless, at least some income is generated to satisfy the creditor, since the debtor participates.
Proposition 2 If the period of good conduct is of …xed length, the debtor will never make the e¢cient e¤ort choice within that period.
Proof. Follows directly from (9) .
The preceding analysis is true for most existing cases, however, it should be shortly noted that it does not represent all possible parameter setups. There are two other setups possible: depending on D and T:
The latter case would be true if her expected lifetime income after the period of good conduct is not su¢ciently large to compensate her even for her mediocre endeavours during the period of good conduct. From (5) we get:
The net income after should outweigh the costs during the period of good conduct, which depends on T and her expected net income (y th ¡ c h ). If (10) ceases to hold, the debtor will refuse to participate in the debt release regulation. This participation constraint is more likely to hold compared to the one of the former German consumer bankruptcy regime (i.e. no debt rescheduling (8) ).
The other possibility would be that remaining debt is su¢ciently small, so that the debtor would be able to repay P within the period of good conduct. Hence, she will try to accomplish the prerequisite as fast as possible. As a result the consumer would choose the high e¤ort level even within the period of good conduct. This happens only if:
the high e¤ort level is more than compensated by future income. Still both of these cases are only marginal phenomena and are, therefore, omitted in the further analysis.
Proposal
Since the existing regulations were shown to su¤er from certain shortcomings, i.e. either do not pay attention to the debtor's rationale or do not adequately satisfy the creditor, a modi…ed rule is proposed. The regulation 'no debt release' was shown in (7) to provide the debtor with undistored incentives as long as P is not too large, i.e. as long as (8) holds. As too high debt deters the debtor from participation. Therefore, it is concluded from Proposition 1 that a payable quantum, i.e. P · P max ; set as prerequisite for debt release, provides the debtor with optimal incentives. This is incentive congruent as shown in (7), since a …xed amount puts the debtor in the position of the residual claimant. And such a quantum should also not exceed P max ; as stated in (8) . The penalty imposed on the debtor under the proposed rule is thus:
Note, that this threshold P max is individually determined upon the debtor's capabilities, i.e. her education, age, social situation as well as the general economic situation. In terms of the model P max is dependent on her remaining lifetime T; the varinace in income y 1 and y 2 and the costs of e¤ort c i :
The debtor gets U 0 in the worst case. If, to the contrary, the penalty would only depend on the original debt then the debtor might in some cases not be willing to participate in the procedure. Hence, setting a …xed amount, which does not overstrain the debtor's capabilities, does set optimal ex-post incentives.
Inter-temporal Considerations
So far, the individual debtor was considered to make the e¤ort choices for t = 2 and all subsequent periods, at the beginning of the period of good conduct. It should, therefore, be explored, whether the debtor may have reason to reconsider her settled decisions at a later date. Therefore, it is now assumed that the debtor makes her e¤ort choice at the beginning of each period. As the debtor has only her working income as the only source of income to ful…ll the requirement, and since this income is uncertain, her …nancial capabilities might turn out to be insu¢cient to pay the required sum.
Consider the most demanding scenario, where the debtor is required to pay P max to receive a debt discharge, i.e. she is compeled to her reservation utility. In t = 2 she has an expected surplus of zero, but would still participate and choose the high e¤ort level. Then after several periods, income realizations might have been high (y 1 ) so that she manages to repay P within shorter time, and so due to an earlier debt release will might receive a positive surplus. The opposite is, however, also possible. Due to several low realizations of income (y 2 ) the debtor's remaining expected income might shrink, so that the participation constraint (5) ceases to hold and the debtor will stop exerting any e¤ort. In such cases the proposal has the same e¤ect as the no debt release regulation, and deter the debtor from any economic activity.
What would be an adequate instrument to counter this e¤ect? One possibility is to adjust the demanded sum to the remaining expected income so that the debtor would still be willing to participate, i.e.
Yet, this is not advisable, as it may cause adverse e¤ects beforehand, because the debtor will take these adjustments into account. She may choose an insu¢cient e¤ort and claim the low realizations as a result of 'bad luck'. In short, such adjustments may damage the incentive e¤ects of the proposed rule. Moreover, they would o¤er a wild range of renegotiation possibilities. This possibility would therefore not be followed.
Another possibility to ensure the ability to ful…ll this obligation the requirement is eased to T y 2 ; which she can accumulate even with the low realizations in all periods -the worst of all possible scenarios. Thus, this could be set as requirement on the way for debt release. Provided that the law maker wants the debtor to be able to accomplish the prerequisites for debt release in all possible states.
This means the maximum amount can only be the lowest possible income that can realize. Besides the fact that this scenario is not likely to occur, the sum of the expected low realizations might be close to zero. As a result, in the more common scenarios the debtor will be able to pay the amount quite fast, giving the creditor a return close to Chapter 7 and also providing similar incentive e¤ects. Hence, this proposal does not seem to be too desirable.
The last possible solution, discussed here, would be to revive the intention of the German regulation and and de…ne a creation period during which the debtor has to devote her income to the creditor. Here her expected income for the next n years is calculated and set as a requirement for debt release, i.e. P max = ny th : The actual length is subject to the intention of the lawmaker and is of subordinate importance ex-post. However, it becomes important with respect to ex-ante stimulant and the deterrence e¤ect of the debt release regulation. The length, upon which the amount is condition, can vary from 6 years, as under the current German regulation, to 3 years as under Ch. 13 of the U.S. bankruptcy code. It should be noted that the amount refers to expected income. So if the debtor is lucky, she may be able to pay the amount already after a shorter period and if not, it may take her some additional years. Since this is a …xed amount the rule continues to be incentive compatible (see (7)).
In an extreme case, or due to exogenous changes on the debtor's income expectations, it is nonetheless possible that the debtor will have to experience a prolonged period of good conduct. This may discourage the debtor and may not really be law makers' intention, as the instrument of debt release should also serve an insurance function against bad income realizations for the debtor. 44 Acknowledging this problem, Bigus and Steiger (2003) discuss the e¤ects of shortening the period of good conduct. A certain amount, which the debtor can expect to repay either with a low e¤ort level within m years, or with the e¢cient e¤ort level within m ¡ r years, is de…ned, i.e. P = (m ¡ r) y th = my tl :
45 : Regardless of the return to the creditor the debtor is released from debt after a maximal length of m years. 46 So at the beginning of the period of good conduct in t = 2; the debtor faces the same incentive compatibility constraint as with any …xed sum:
Substituting (m ¡ r) y th = my tl into the relation again leads to (2). However, this is true only in t = 2: For the following periods, the debtor will have to calculate again in each period t; 8t¸3; whether high e¤ort is pro…table, or it would be better for her simply to 'wait', i.e. to choose the low e¤ort and wait for the period of good conduct to pass. Let m t which are left in the prolonged period of good conduct and r t shortening the debtor can expect by choosing the high e¤ort. So her incentive compatibility constraint in each period is thus the same as (9) with the appropriate indices, which can be rearranged to
If the expected shortening of the period of good conduct is su¢cient the 44 see e.g. Posner (1999) p. 973.
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Always keep in mind that for debts lower than the discussed upper bound P max the entire outstanding debt is demanded from the debtor.
debtor will choose the high e¤ort, otherwise she will only choose the low e¤ort. The result would be a welfare loss, yet it can be shown that this would only happen in a very limited number of cases.
It should be noted that the debtor has to be given a share of the surplus under all modi…ed rules, this means that there are limits in the possibilities of redistribution between the participants. From a practical perspective the modi…cation P = ny th seems more relevant, as it puts the debtor only under surveilance only for a certain amount of time. A maximal length of the period of good conduct is, moreover, desirable as it would insure the debtor against bad realizations or changes in her income expectations due to external reasons.
Remark 2 For a D · P max the debtor should be asked for the entire amount, since this had been shown in (7) to be a non-distorting regulation.
Remark 3 It should be noted, that these additional restrictions of P max also apply to the regulation 'no debt release.'
E¤ects of Risk-Aversion
Up to now we have considered all parties as risk neutral. However, this doesn't seem apropriate for a consumer, especially when her remaining lifetime income is at stake. Hence, it should be tested, whether the above deduced results are still valid when the debtor is assumed to be risk averse.
47;48
It needs to be shown that the individual would still be willing to participate and would su¢ciently strive to ful…ll the requirement of the bankruptcy regulation. To simplify matters, the problem is considered in a one period framework, i.e. the debtor chooses an e¤ort at costs C l and C h resp., resulting either in the high Y 1 or low Y 2 realization. Her utility function U (Y ) is strictly concave; i.e. U 0 (Y ) > 0; U 00 (Y ) < 0; with Y 2 fY 1 ; Y 2 g : Furthermore, high e¤ort is still assumed to be e¢cient, i.e. adapting assumption (2) (16) or rearranged to: 47 This is important, since it has also been noted that the personal bankruptcy regulation ful…lls the desire for insurance for consumers, by cutting the downside risk in case of unforeseen shocks (as, for example, noted by Adler et al. (2000)). 48 Note, that we do not need to reconsider the objective function (the minimization problem of the creditor) since the amount dedicated to the creditor does not change.
The incentive compatibility constraint is now:
and can be rewritten as
To demonstrate that the incentive compatibility constraint holds, it remains to be shown that
This means that the di¤erence in utility in the constraint case (i.e. within the period of good conduct) has to be at least as large as in the unconstrained case. Due to the concavity of the utility function, this inequality holds 8P > 0: The debtor's wealth position is shifted by the amount P to the left, and thus to a steeper part of the utility curve. This can also be seen in the graphs below. In Figure 3 the shift in debtor's decision is shown, while Figure 2 is a magni…cation of the latter, as the debtor is actually comparing the utility of the expected value with both e¤ort choices. ¢E (U) states the di¤erence in expected utility resulting from the variant e¤ort choices, and the debtor will choose a high e¤ort only if the additional expected utility outweighs the costs, for the unconstraint case this is always true due to assumption (16) . Figure 3 shows, how the decision problem of the debtor changes, when being subject to the provisions of the bankruptcy regulation. It can be seen that due to the marginal decreasing returns, the debtor is more willing to choose the high e¤ort in lower income ranges, so the incentive compatibility constraint continues to hold. The next section states the conditions for the proposal to hold under risk aversion with a continuous e¤ort. Furthermore, the participation constraint needs to be reexamined. Here, no general conclusions can be drawn, as one needs to evaluate whether the debtor would be willing to pay less when considered risk averse than when considered risk neutral. This generally depends on the level of the reservation utility, and the participation constraint thus changes to:
Depending on the intersection with the x-axis and the exact shape of the utility function the reservation utility might change.
To resume: When the penalty is a …xed amount and the debtor is risk averse, she will continue to work hard during the period of good conduct. However, the amount demanded from the debtor might have to be lowered to ensure her participation.
Results
The analysis has produced some results, which are restated below. It has been shown that regulations a¤ect the debtor's choices post …ling, and are capable to distort her incentives, i.e. her economic performance considerably.
1. Chapter 7 causes the least distortions the debtor will always choose the ex-post e¢cient e¤ort. However, the creditor is left insu¢ciently satis…ed.
2. Generally, no debt release does set the right ex-post incentives for the debtor, but there is a maximal amount the debtor can be asked for, i.e. some form of debt discharge is ex-post e¢cient.
3. A …xed period of good conduct sets insu¢cient incentives for the debtor to work hard.
4.
A particular amount set as precondition for debt release, generate better incentives for the debtor to choose a high e¤ort. Note, that this amount depends on her individual situation and skills.
5. Due to the limited wealth, the prerequisite for debt release needs to be eased to ensure the debtor's continuos interest and capability of ful…llment of the requirement. Even when the debtor is regarded as risk neutral, she cannot be brought down to her reservation utility and receives some surplus.
6. Under the proposed rule the debtor is still willing to work hard even if she is considered risk averse.
7. The existence of a collateral or its value has no e¤ects on the individual's e¤ort choice post-…ling.
8. With the proposed regulation, the creditor is better o¤, and is furthermore not a¤ected by the debtor's e¤ort choice. An insu¢cient e¤ort just postpones payment and does not reduce it.
Ex-Ante Analysis
The previous part analyzed the e¤ects of various bankruptcy regulations on debtor's incentives to work after …ling. Most existing regulations entail a welfare loss ex-post, as they provoke the debtor to choose an insu¢cient e¤ort, sometimes even resulting in the abstention from any economic activity. A rule was proposed to circumvent such welfare losses. Yet, the analysis has also shown that debt release remains an inevitable quality of a bankruptcy code. This chapter investigates how the prospect of debt release accounts for changes in the credit contracts and how this converts the choices of the participants. Since the bankruptcy regulation determines the case of default, it, thereby partly, sets the provisions of a credit contract, and thus also establishes the incentives for the participants, in particular, the motivation for the debtor to pay her debts. It is often postulated that the prospect of debt release may distort the debtor's endeavors to repay the credit so that the bankruptcy provisions increase the costs and availability of credit.
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The logic is as follows: since under some regulations the debtor does not have to pay the entire debt in all states, she might be tempted to maliciously default or at least to choose an insu¢cient e¤ort. As a result, credits become less available to consumers or too costly, this may cause a welfare loss. In a hidden action model it is investigated if and how much the discussed regulations distort the debtor's ex-ante choices.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 5.1 introduces the additional assumptions and in the following section the …rst best solution is stated as a benchmark. In the succeeding section the e¤ects of the four conventionalized bankruptcy rules are discussed and in section 5.4 a quanti…cation of these e¤ects is given. Finally section 5.5 examines the e¤ects of the debtor's risk attitude, …rst by relying on classic risk aversion and then investing possible behavior of a bounded rational debtor.
INSERT SOME SUITABLE REFERENCES!!!!!
Setting
In accordance with the time structure as it was introduced in Figure 1 , we would now focus on the dates t = 0 to t = 2 : i.e. how the debtor's effort decision, which in ‡uences the likelihood of the shock, is a¤ected by the patterns of the bankruptcy code.
For this part of the analysis the following additional assumptions are made:
² For the time structure:
The debtor borrowed a credit or loan L at t = 0 from the creditor, which she uses to buy some asset A; providing her a non-pecuniary bene…t of U (L).
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The loan is due at t = 2 with a payment of D:
² Meanwhile, at t = 1, in order to meet her debt obligation, the debtor has to acquire some wealthw , withw¸D.
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This wealth is subject to a random shock: with probability ±; ± 2 [0; 1] ; the debtor is fortunate and earns w and with probability (1 ¡ ±) her endeavors do not prove fruitful, as she earns nothing and she has to …le for bankruptcy. The realization of income is assumed to be observable and veri…able, i.e. the debtor cannot hide w and pretend to be insolvent. 
² In the solvent state she has to pay D to the creditor, while when being bankrupt, she has to endure the reprisals of the applicable bankruptcy code and pays P out of her future income.
² The debtor can in ‡uence the probabilities of the realization for the states by choosing some e¤ort at costs k: For simplicity, the parameters are set such that the debtor can choose the probability ± at costs k (±) with k 0 > 0; k 00 > 0: The cost function is strictly increasing in ± and has, furthermore, the following properties k (0) = 0 and k (1) = 1: This means an investment of zero costs would cause a de…nite default, while avoiding the reducing the probability of default to zero is in…nitely costly.
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To keep things simple, the debtor is assumed to derive the entire bene…t of this asset immediately, and afterwards the asset has no use for her nor any considerable resale value, e.g. the debtor uses the loan to …nance a fancy vacation trip.
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One might also think of w as the income of several periods as L might be rather large, as it takes several periods to pay P . ² As it was already introduced in section 3. and analyzed 4. in each period t¸2 the debtor has a working income of y t . In this section only the accumulated income considered. Y S indicates accumulated expected net future income after t = 2, with t 2 f2; :::; T g, in the solvent and Y B accumulated future income in the insolvent (bankrupt) state,
For the time being, future income expectations, i.e. income after t = 2, are assumed to remain unchanged due to bankruptcy. Yet, the debtor's e¤ort choices might be alternated due to the provisions of the bankruptcy code, and therefore her income expectations might change. To indicate these changes the index Y B is used, as, for example, under the 'no debt release' when D > P max the debtor abstains and the return to both parties is zero. Hence, if the bankruptcy regulation causes no distortions, as for example under Chapter 7, Y B = Y S : This is to separate the various e¤ects, and changes in income expectations due to distress will be discussed later in this chapter.
² The debtor has no other monetary wealth or assets that could be seized upon …ling, in particular, the asset bought in t = 0 with the credit has no resale value at t = 2:
² For the time being participants are again assumed to be risk neutral, and the discount rate is still assumed to be zero.
² The credit market is perfectly competitive, thus the creditor can make only a pro…t of zero.
Having set those additional assumptions, we now determine the conditions that shape the participant's incentives. The debtor chooses ± as to maximize her future income:
The debtor's income consists of the bene…t derived from the loan U (L) ; and her future income. In the solvent state she earns w and pays D to the creditor and has furthermore an It is assumed that at t = 0 borrowing had been bene…cial for the debtor, since it increased her expected utility, i.e. U C¸UN C ; with the index C and N C representing the utility with a credit and with no credit respectively.
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When the debtor is solvent, she will choose the e¢cient e¤ort e h in each following period. When she is insolvent, her e¤ort decision is subject to the provisions of the applicable bakruptcy code, as it was discussed in the ex-post analysis.
While the creditor, as he is acting on a competitive market, can only insure an expected pro…t of zero
As we are analyzing insolvency the payment in the bad state cannot exceed the one in the good state, i.e. D¸L¸P¸0. P is determined by the applicable bankruptcy regime, the creditor's only latitude is to adjust D accordingly to ensure that (25) holds. Thus when signing the credit contract these three decisions are taken simultaneously. The debtor decides about whether to take the credit and on her e¤ort level in t = 1 and the creditor decides on D:
First Best
The social optima is found by jointly maximizing the returns of both participants Y D + Y C i.e. (23) + (25) , and at the …rst best the debtor's ex-post choices are, of course, not distorted so that
which yields when being maximized:
Solved for ±; equation (27) determines ± ¤ as the debtor's …rst best e¤ort level. Hence, an undistorting bankruptcy regime should ensure that an effort level at costs k (± ¤ ) is chosen by the debtor. Equation (27) states that marginal return should equal marginal costs, and future income is not relevant for this decision. Since future income is by assumption not a¤ected by the e¤ort level chosen in t = 1: Note, that this outcome is equivalent to the debtor's e¤ort decision without any credit. This is not a coincidencesince the credit is not used for production or to change the debtor's income expectations in any way, it should, hence, not change her e¤ort decision. The following chapter analyzes how the debtor performs under the various regulations.
Performance of Various Rules
In the ex-post analysis the e¤ects of various bankruptcy regimes on the debtor to work after …ling for bankruptcy, as well as the resulting returns for the debtor. This part investigates how the ex-post consequences of the various regimes a¤ect the ex-ante situation: namely the availability of credits, the charged risk premium and, most important, the debtor's e¤ort decision in t = 1:
In contrast to the …rst best, participants make their choices independently. First the general condition for the debtor is analyzed and then the adjustments of the creditor are considered. The debtor faces the maximization problem as stated in (23), which leads to the …rst order condition
which solved for ± determines the probability of default. It can be seen that (28) only corresponds to (27) either when Y S = Y B and D = P; or, more generally, when P ¡ D + Y S ¡ Y B = 0: If the above holds, the regulations of the bankruptcy regime implements the …rst best ± ¤ : In all other cases a di¤erent ± will be chosen by the debtor.
When the debtor decides on her e¤ort she has already received L and enjoys the bene…t U (L), thus it is not relevant for her e¤ort decision. Yet, she still has to pay for the loan. In order to do this she bears the full costs of e¤ort k (±) while she receives only a considerable lower proportion, w ¡ D; of her endavours. She weighs this reduced income against the costs of generation and the expected penalty P in the insolvent case. However, the decsision in t = 1 does now not have consequences on the immediate income realization, w, it also a¤ects her future wealth, i.e. Y B 6 = Y S :
Before investigating the e¤ects of the various bankruptcy regulations in detail, we shortly consider the general consequences of debt release on the debtor's decision; whether the prospect of debt release will increase or decrease the ± selected by the debtor compared to ± ¤ as deduced in (27) . As the bankruptcy code determines or at least sets an upper bound for P; the relation P · L · D can be set. If the payment in the good and the bad state is the same, i.e. P = D; the loan causes no deviations from ± ¤ : In all other cases, P < D, i.e. the payment in the bad state is lower; and the larger the gap is, the lower is the ± the debtor chooses. Also, future income can be a¤ected by the provisions of the bankruptcy regulation, Y B · Y S : Here the larger the possible loss due to bankruptcy is, the greater the precaution the debtor will take. Yet, the decrease in future income is only due to changes in the debtor's e¤ort decision, and such a change would hardly be to her own detriment. Hence, a reduced income due to distress is on the expenses of the creditor, as it reduces his expected return.
The creditor, as he is acting on a competitive market, and so insures an expected pro…t of zero. As long as the payment in the two states is the same, P = D, he cannot ask for a risk premium. When the payment in the insolvent state is set by the bankruptcy regulation, with a given L the creditor can only manipulate D; to ensure his participation. The debtor reaction to this adjustment can be found by substituting (25) into (28) w
Which solved for ± determines the e¤ort level of the debtor chosen for a particular credit contract. Due to the fact that L ¡ P¸0 the debtor will choose a lower e¤ort level compared to ± ¤ : Yet, the more distorting the bankruptcy regime is, i.e. the greater the di¤erence Y S ¡ Y B the better will be the deterrence e¤ect of the regime. In other words, the more future income the debtor expects forgoe due to bankruptcy the more precaution the debtor will take. The following paragraph discusses the e¤ects of the various bankruptcy regimes, and the suceeding section gives some quanti…cations of the discussed e¤ects.
Chapter 7
When a debtor …les for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, the creditor can seize her current assets, but has no claim on her future income. As a result, the debtor's e¤ort decision ex-post is undistorted, i.e. Y S = Y B . Since in this setting, the debtor was assumed to have no further belongings, the expected collection rate of the creditor in the insolvent state is zero, i.e. P = A = 0: As a result the creditor increases D considerably to ensure at least an expected pro…t of zero, so that L = ±D. The debtor chooses her e¤ort according to
It is straight forward that this rule incentives the debtor to considerably lower ± and thus creates rather large ex-ante distortions, simply because the debtor does not lose much in case of distress. This e¤ect is mitigated either by a larger income w; so that the debtor keeps more in the solvent state. The other possibility for mitigation would be the existence of a collateral, both will cause smaller deviations from ± 
No Debt Release
No debt release is the other extreme -the debtor is unlimited liable for the debts with her entire current and future belongings. The ex-post analysis has shown that the debtor is willing to strive for payment of the outstanding debt as long as the required payment does not exceed P max : We, therefore, need to di¤erentiate between two cases:
For the former (P · P max ), the analysis is relatively straight froward: The creditor always receives the entire outstanding debt and has no need to charge a risk premium, i.e. L = D = P: In the debtor's …rst order condition (28) the additional terms cancel out, and the condition is equivalent to the …rst best (27) . She will choose the e¢cient ± ¤ : Therefore, as long within this range no debt release supports the e¢cient allocation.
In the latter case (P > P max ) things are di¤erent. The remaining debt is in case of distress exceeds the debtor's expected working income, as a result the debtor prescinds from any e¤ort, and her expected future income is Y B = 0: This, in turn, causes the recovery rate of the creditor to drop to zero (P = Y B = 0). Even though, the creditor's ex-ante expected collection rate in case of distress is equivalent to the one of Chapter 7, i.e. zero, the ex-ante incentive e¤ect to the debtor is not. By defaulting, she loses her entire potential future income, or, more precisely, any further endeavors are futile. Her e¤ort ex-ante decision is thus determined by:
is the payment to the creditor in the good state, and is determined in a similar way as under Ch. 7, by the creditor's zero pro…t constraint (25) . Yet, here the debtor will choose a signi…cant higher ±, since she looses Y S when being insolvent. Nonetheless, it should be noted that in the present setup the chosen ± would never exceed ± ¤ ; since the future income Y S · D: This becomes clear when considering that future income expectations are assumed to remain unchanged due to distress, i.e. Y S = Y B : Hence, even in the solvent state her future income would be insu¢cient to pay the debts, D¸Y S = P max : This means w has to be rather large to pay the credit. This How this a¤ects the risk premium in a quantitative matter will be discussed when the e¤ects are quanti…ed in the next section.
German Regulation
Under the current German insolvency regulation the debtor's liability is bounded to her assets and her income during the period of good conduct. In terms of the model P = 6y
The creditor can expect some compensation even when the debtor is in distress. Due to the distorting e¤ects of this regulation ex-post, the debtor's income di¤ers when being subject to the provisions of the bankruptcy code di¤ers: Y S = T (y th ¡ c th ) and Y B = (T ¡ 6) (y th ¡ c th ) ¡ 6c tl : Therefore, her e¤ort decision is now based on the equation
Hence, the debtor foregoes potential income during the six years enduring period of good conduct, while having less costs of e¤ort during that period. Whether the selected e¤ort rises or falls compared to the optimal e¤ort as de…ned in (27) depends on the amount of debt. It can be argued, that the …rst term 1 ± (L ¡ 6y tl ) decreases her e¤ort (representing the expected repayment to the creditor), while 6 (y th ¡ c th ¡ c tl ) represents the loss in future income she encounters when being subject to the provisions of the bankruptcy code. The debtor will choose ± < ± ¤ , since the …rst term is clearly larger than the second.
Proposal
As under the regulation with no debt release we have to distinguish between two cases, whether P · P max or P > P max : The proposal does not change the debtor's e¤ort decision ex-post, i.e. Y S = Y B : As long as P · P max there are no distortions of the e¤ort choices neither ex-post nor ex-ante. Since the debtor pays the entire debt in all states, and therefore internalizes all the costs of credit, as to make the creditor face no risk at all, i.e. L = D = P: Distortions in the debtor's ex-ante choice might only arise, when L > P max : The creditor is not paid the entire sum in all states, as a result he will charge a risk premium, however, this premium will be lower as the one charged under no debt release, since the expected return to the creditor is higher, while the expected net loss incurred on the debtor remains the same.
The greater the di¤erence between L and P max the smaller the ± the debtor will choose. Note, that the creditor still receives a considerable (based on the debtor's capabilities) amount in the insolvent state. This means that for debts exceeding P max the debtor may choose ± < ± ¤ ; but it is the least distorting of all discussed regulations.
To summarize: There are several factors which determine the debtor's e¤ort choice ex-ante. First, they are determined by the magnitude of the credit and the set of payments in the various states. Moreover, they depend on the debtor's personal characteristics, such as her costs of e¤ort or her future income. It had been shown that in certain circumstances all of the discussed regulations may induce the debtor to deviate from ± ¤ . Still, it was shown that the proposal,causes the least distortions of all rules.
Risk Attitude
The analysis in the previous part has shown that any kind of debt release may prompt the debtor to choose an e¤ort below the e¢cient level, while trying to externalize at least part of the costs of bankruptcy on the creditor. The analysis suggested that a larger proportion of debtors should …le for bankruptcy. Yet this is not what has been found. Also, from an intuitive perspective this result seems to be not very convincing. Especially upon consideration of the kind of pro…t an individual debtor may expect, when risking her entire future income or at least a signi…cant proportion of it? The reason for this result might result from the risk neutrality assumption. Therefore, the risk attitude of individual debtor's is now explicitly considered. In order to examine whether it produces any qualitative di¤erent results.
It is often argued that consumer bankruptcy code also serves an insurance function for consumers against bad income realizations: by cutting the downside for bad income realizations, it allows consumers to reduce the variance in their income realizations.
The debtor is now assumed to have a strictly concave utility function as a function of her income U (:) ; with U 0 > 0; U 00 < 0: Thus she is now maximizing her utility as follows:
Yielding a …rst order condition of
Which states that not only the discrepancy between the good and the bad state should be equal to the It needs to be analyzed how her decision changes compared to her previous situation without a credit -does the chosen e¤ort increase or decrease. We know that the debtor expect to be at least as well o¤ with the credit than without. This can be stated as follows in her participation constraint:
this can be written in more detail as:
In other words she expects to be at least as well o¤ with the credit than without it. Otherwise, taking the credit would not be rational. How does her incentive compatibility constraint change? Two e¤ects underlie this issue. First the variance is lowered, and second, due to the bene…t of the asset the debtor's wealth position is shifted to the right, i.e. U (L)¸L:The latter states that the debtor should have a reason for taking the loan, but also if the debtor gets no extra non-monetary bene…t from taking the credit (U (L) = L), taking the credit might be bene…cial. This is shown in Figure 4 . To illustrate that assume that U (L) = L so that there is no non-monetary bene…t from borrowing. Without any debt release, or if the credit sum is su¢ciently low so that P = L = D the e¤ort decision of the debtor does not change. She is simply as well o¤ as before. However, if there is a debt release, i.e. P · L · D; the bankruptcy regulation reduces the variance also provides an insurance function to the debtor, by reducing the variance of income realizations. Figure 4 shows that the debtor's utility might increase in this case, even though the expected payo¤ decreases. In the bad state she now has Y B ¡ P + L as her wealth, compared to Y S she would have had without the credit, given for the time being that the bankruptcy regulation is a non-distorting. The former is always greater since P · L: The reverse is true for the good state. Where she has now Y S + w ¡ D + L; compared to Y S + w, where the utility with credit is smaller, since D¸L: 54 Thus, by taking the credit the consumer is able to reduce the variance in the lottery she is facing. As a result she will also always lower her e¤ort, hence, insu¢ciently strive to meet her debt obligations. Put di¤erently, here the credit provides a reversed insurance to the debtor, which …rst pays out and then asks for the premium. Unless some non-linear value is attributed to U (L) as the non-monetary bene…t of the credit, which will be later elaborated on in the analysis.
On the other hand if we consider a bankruptcy regime, which does distort the debtor's income expectancies, i.e. Y S > Y B : It might well be that Y B ¡ P + L < Y S so that the above result is no more necessarily true. Moreover, some non-linear value might be attributed to U (L) so that the wealth state with the credit is shifted to the right considerably. As a result, no de…nite statement of the e¤ects of the consideration of risk-aversion can be outlined.
Discussion
This section summarizes the main results, discusses some assumptions and …nally aiming at giving some policy implications. The model has states that a debt release is inevitable under certain circumstances, however, an immediate debt release -as possible under Ch. 7 -gives poor incentives from an ex-ante perspective. Hence, before a debt release is granted to the debtor certain obstacles should be placed in her way. Two kind of obstacles are known in the various regulations. The …rst one aims at some kind of reeducation of the debtor's attitude towards her behavior with other people's money and place certain non-monetary penalties on the debtor to teach her to not to default. This was not discuss in detail, since e¤ects on the debtor are very personal and can hardly be measured in detail and accuarcy. Moreover, they do not produce any additional return, once the debtor is insolvent. Instead we have been discussing several requirements that aim to provide a satisfaction to the creditor at least partly. It was found that the least distorting requirement should be a …xed sum of money that is based on the debtor' capabilities (i.e. observe her participation constraint). Also, it has positive ex-ante e¤ects, increasing the expected compensation of the creditor in case of default, and lowering the risk of default, by motivating the debtor to strive to avoid default. Though distortions seem to persist, they were shown to be minimized to a reasonable parameter range under the proposed regulation.
The model makes a couple of simplifying assumptions, e.g. no discount rate or the fact that the credit is due at one date, which facilitate the analysis and do not a¤ect the qualitative results of the analysis. The analysis had been focused on four regulations only, and one might wonder why Ch. 13 was not considered. Under this regulation a payment plan is put together that might be closer to the proposal made in this paper, giving better incentives for a high e¤ort during the period of good conduct. However, Ch. 13 guarantees creditors only as much as they would get under Ch. 7 and thus ex-ante incentives would be the same. Therefore, it was decided not to include Ch. 13 into the analysis, since it would not contribute to the results. The analy-sis has shown that it is possible to overcome the shortcomings created by certain regulations ex-post and provide the debtor with better incentives for economic performance after distress, and not necessarily on the expense of the creditor. All regulations, even unlimited liability, were shown to create distortions in the debtor's ex-ante choices. Still, one might ponder on the scope of these distortions, especially when the debtor is rationally bounded and only considers the uncertain parts of the lottery she is facing.
The …xed period of good conduct: In the German regulation the debtor is obliged to attempt to repay during the succeeding six years. The analysis showed that this …xed period leaves the debtor with no incentives to perform well. Even though the opposite had clearly been in the intention of the law maker; the debtor should try hard and show remorse during that period, which is further established by the fact that debt release is only granted at the end of the period, if the court …nds her to be su¢ciently quali…ed. So in a way there is an implicit incentive scheme invoked into the law, but there is no direct reward for the individual for behaving well. It should be noted that even the German regulation provides some incentive mechanisms for the debtor. For example heritages received during the period of good conduct are only garnished with 50%. Also her income is not entirely garnished during the whole period of good conduct, during the …fth and sixth year 10%, 20% resp. of her income are being redistributed to the debtor by the trustee, -garnishment rate is diminished ( §292 InsO). Also, it cannot be contended that the choice of e¤ort is entirely unobservable to the creditor. There might be certain features which might be observable. For example, the local court in Hamburg dismissed a debtor from his period of good conduct because he only had a part time job, which the court found to be an insu¢cient e¤ort. 55 However, if it was possible to …nd a regulation where compliance is also in the debtor's interest, things might prove easier. It had been shown that a design of the period of good conduct with some amount of money as requirement, leaves the debtor as the residual claimant and therefore improves her incentives. It is very important to note that such a sum needs to be carefully adapted to the debtor's capabilities. To the extent that she cannot be expected to have some income during the following years, she should be given an immediate fresh start. Furthermore, we had brie ‡y tested that the results are robust in regards to risk aversion. It was shown that the debtor might in some circumstances even choose a higher e¤ort during the period of good conduct. This probably adverse e¤ect had been bounded by an adjustment of the participation constraint.
We did not discuss the stigma insolvency, which might impose on an in- dividual debtor. Generally, it might help to mitigate distortions from an ex-ante perspective, but would not create any additional return ex-post.
56
The consideration of stigma is of practical relevance since still today many countries have regulations which aim more at punishing the debtor for default. As an example in Anglo-Saxon countries a defaulting debtor losses the right to hold a public o¢ce during the period of good conduct. Another example is the bankruptcy ‡ag on borrowers' credit report who defaulted before in the U.S.
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Inspired by this intention we refer to the requirement put on the debtor to obtain a debt release, penalty. Nevertheless, in the analysis we do not explicitly consider non-monetary penalties as found in many bankruptcy codes, since they are rather di¢cult to quantify, and, focus, instead on regulation as a means to collect money for the creditor.
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In the ex-ante part of the analysis, the performance of the debtor during the credit contract was considered, and thereby also e¤ects on the credit supply and demand. With risk neutral individuals it had been shown that there are always distortions in the e¤ort level if the regulation is any, except for no debt release. However, since even with no debt release there is a maximal amount the individual could pay, distortions might continue to exist under these regulations. However, the harder the regulation ex-post is the better the incentives given to the individual are. As a result either D had to be increased to overcome the increased default risk or, credits had to be rationed. Also, the history of distress was not analyzed in detail, as bankruptcy is usually the result of a gradual development. In this model the debtor got all of a sudden and irrevocable into distress, which seems to be not really realistic. It should, therefore, be an intersting question for future research, how the proposed rule would perform when the debtor is assumed to enter gradually into …nancial di¢culty. Last it was shown that considering risk aversion the results might be mitigated.
There are a couple of extentions which can be thought of: The possibility of out of court negotiations, as was not discussed before. Also, the fact that parties fail to agree on a default regulation ex-ante, as well as ex-post, was taken as exogenous. The paper did not discuss the e¤ects of non-monetary penalties on the decision of the debtor. A further application of the model is the application of this rule to an entrepreneur, in order to turn down the hassle of adopting ine¢ciently risky projects shortly prior to bankruptcy. These are very interesting questions and are left to future research. 56 For a discussion of the e¤ects of stigma in bankruptcy proceedings ex-post, see Bigus and Steiger (2001) . 57 See Musto (1999) for a analysis of these e¤ects. 
Conclusion
During the last decade, several European countries identi…ed the need for a consumer debt release regulation, and amended their bankurptcy codes accordingly, allowing consumers and other non-business entities to petition for debt discharge. The devices, which qualify the consumer for a debt discharge are manifold, but can be grouped into three categories: seizure of current assets, garnishment of future income and other non-monetary penalties. The paper explicitly integrates ex-post e¤ects of the limits of liability into the analysis of credit contracts. The analysis has shown that debt release is an inevitable property of a bankruptcy regime with respect to ex-post incentives. However, this necessity is likely to create distortions in the debtor's ex-ante choice. Thus many bankruptcy codes recognize the necessity to pose an obstacle in the debtor's way to debt release. One possibility is non-monetary penalties, which can be found, for example, in the British regulation or in many other common wealth countries. However, the analysis in this paper did focus on monetary penalties. Showing that though debt release may prompt the debtor to make a distorted e¤ort choice from an ex-ante perspective, these distortions were shown to be small. When using the …ndings of bounded rationality, adverse distortions were shown to vanish altogether.
In a simple multiple period model ex-ante and ex-post incentive structure of four exemplary bankruptcy regulations where analyzed. Though an unlimited liability regime is usually thought of to provide optimal ex-ante incentives, it was shown that such a regime can seriously distort the debtor's ex-post incentives, i.e. deter her from any economic activity. It was shown that in some cases there might also be distortions in the ex-ante choice. Debt release was shown to be a desirable quality of a bankruptcy code, however, many of the existing regulations were shown to distort the individual debtor's e¤ort choice ex-post, since they pay little attention to the debtor's incentives during the period of good conduct and her …nancial capabilities. Existing regulations were shown to pay insu¢cient attention to these matters. A rule was developed, which implements the optimal e¤ort and also increases the collection rate of the creditors. The results were shown to be stable to the introduction of risk aversion.
In the ex-ante analysis, the e¤ects of the regulations on the decisions of the consumer prior to distress where considered. It had been shown that the harder the regulation is, the better the ex-ante incentives are. Generally any kind of debt discharge was shown to have negative e¤ects on the debtor's performance, but even absent of debt release, the debtor's choices might be distorted in some cases. This e¤ect is likely to result in credit rationing and an increase in interest rate. A numerical example showed quanti…cations of these malformations. As a conclusion, it can be argued that a sophisticated debt discharge regulation for consumers maintains to be a desirable feature of a bankruptcy code. When being subject to the provisions of the bankruptcy code, the debtor's decision problem is shifted to the right. As a result the di¤erence in utility between the high and the low realization of income increases, i.e. the debtor is now even more willing to choose the high e¤ort. The preceise decision problem is, of course, pictured in the previous graph.
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E C E NC Figure 4 : By taking the credit the debtor is able to reduce the variance in her expected income, shifting the payo¤s in both states inwards and, thereby, reducing the risk. As a result she will also lower her e¤ort to strive for the good realization.
